Readings
Texts
- J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", chapter 1 (from last time)
- J.S. Mill, "Utilitarianism", chapter 2 (from last time)
Notes
- Classical Utilitarianism (from last time)
- Is Happiness All that Matters? (from last time)
- Are Consequences All that Matter?
- A (Partial) Map of UET
- Utilitarianism
Cases
Synopsis
Today we began with our second pop quiz (yay!) and considered an extremely important question Classical Utilitarianism raises: is happiness all that matters?
That is to say, we considered the properties of Classical Utilitarianism: Objective A-Posteriori, Universal, Egalitarian, Maximal, Consequential, Eudaimonic, and Act-Evaluative. We narrowed our focus on the assumption of eudaimonism--literally, 'good-spirit'--by drawing an important distinction between intrinsic goods, or those good we seek for their own sake, and extrinsic (variously, instrumental) goods, which are sought for the sake of something else. We first gave an argument in the style of Aristotle that all the goods we seek ultimately aim at happiness.
Yet we further argued that CU's assumption that happiness is the sole intrinsic good (eudaimonism) may be problematic, since it can be argued that happiness is not the sole intrinsic good. Indeed, it would seem that such things as honor and friendship are also intrinsic goods, given our arguments.
Utilitarianism is, however, a rich idea.
Responding to this objection often consists of changing the measure of utility. If happiness is not the sole intrinsic good, then we reject happiness as the measure of utility. Possible alternative measures are pleasure (hedonism), kinds of pleasure (qualified hedonism), best interests (idealism), or preferences (preferentialism). By changing how they measure utility, the utilitarian is able to meet the criticism that happiness is not the sole intrinsic good by developing what amount to alternative utilitarian ethical theories to CU. Utilitarianism thus shows us that the idea of utility is rich indeed.
Utilitarian Ethical Theory (UET) is thus a cluster of theories all of which start from the notion that the morality of an action is determined by its consequences. Crudely put, right actions have good consequences; wrong actions have bad consequences. Exactly how we determine the good in good consequences or the bad in bad consequences is a problem for axiology, or the study of value. We might argue, for example, that happiness is the sole intrinsic good, where intrinsic goods are those goods sought for their own sake and extrinsic or instrumental goods are sought for the sake of something else. If happiness is the sole intrinsic good, then those states of affairs which bring about greater happiness are intrinsically more valuable than states of affairs which do not. If, further, we seek to maximize happiness by our actions for the greatest number considered equally, we have the core idea of what we we've been calling Classical Utilitarianism (CU), which is just EAU, as it turns out.
Next today we discovered that the very notion that consequences are all that matters for morality may pose serious problems the utilitarian, who cannot give up consequentialism without abandoning utilitarianism altogether!
That is, Classical Utilitarianism and its many variations (Hedonism, Qualified-Hedonism, Idealism, and Preferentialism) assumes that consequences are all that can be used to determine the morality of an action. Yet this is problematic because it gives rise to the Justice, Rights, and Backward-Looking Reasons arguments. The utilitarian response cannot be to jettison consequentialism, since that would be to give up on the very idea of UET.
It is important to understand the Justice, Rights, and Backward-Looking Reasons arguments so as to appreciate the utilitarian response. Specifically, we found that the utilitarian responds to these arguments by changing from an act-evaluative theory to a rule-evaluative theory. Thus, instead of calculating the utility of alternative actions, we calculate the utility of all actions done according to a specified rule. That is, instead of considering the consequences of a particular action, the rule-utilitarian looks instead at the consequences which accrue from consistently acting according to a particular rule or policy.
Today we discussed the major anti-consequentialist arguments levied against utilitarianism. Next time we will see possible responses the utilitarian might offer to these extremely important, apparently devastating arguments.