Readings
Texts
- Raja Halwani, "On Fucking Around" (from last time)
- Frederick A. Elliston, "In Defense of Promiscuity" (from last time)
- Luke Brunning, "The Distinctiveness of Polyamory" (pdf)
Reading Quiz Questions
- What does Halwani finally conclude is problematic about casual sex and promiscuity?
- How does Elliston respond to the argument that promiscuity poses a threat to monogamy?
- How does Elliston respond to the argument that promiscuous people are unfaithful, unreliable, and deceitful?
- What are the four substantive objections to polyamory Brunning considers but ultimately rejects?
Synopsis
Today we continued our discussion of Elliston's arguments by unpacking the (true) claim that "promiscuity is presumptively morally wrong."
The idea of a presumptive truth is made clear by analogy to the legal system. A defendant to a crime is presumptively innocent--that is, innocent until proven guilty. What this means of course is that the prosecution bears the burden of proof: they must demonstrate that the defendant committed the crime. All the defense need do is show that the prosecution has not met their burden of proof. That is, because the defendant is presumed to be innocent, they don't have to prove their innocence. They only have to show that attempts to prove their guilt fail. Think about the OJ Simpson trial when the lawyer Johnny Cochrane chanted to the jury "if it doesn't fit, you must acquit!" This was in reference to the infamous 'bloody glove' evidence which was introduced by the prosecution as linking Simpson directly to the murders.
A good question is, why do we presume innocence? Why not require those charged to prove their innocence? Well, first, it is a very difficult thing to prove you didn't commit a crime. Second, it is generally conceded that "it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to jail one innocent man." If we're going to err, lets err on the side of protecting the innocent!
But I digress.
For our purposes, the claim that promiscuity is presumptively morally wrong amounts to saying that those, like Elliston, who would hold otherwise, bear the burden of proof. In this context, Elliston has to do two things: first, he has to show that arguments for the thesis that promiscuity is morally wrong are unconvincing; and, second, that substantial arguments against the thesis that promiscuity is morally wrong can be given. So that is why his paper is organized as it is.
Regarding his counterarguments to undermine arguments for the thesis that promiscuity is morally wrong, we found that the so-called 'Western Norm' is on the face of it absurd insofar as it compels a deeply problematic plan: love → proposal → marriage → sex → children. Naturally the rationale is grounded in the connection between sex and having children and the need for raising children in a stable environment. But the connection between sex and having children can be and regularly is severed by technology (contraception, to be sure, but also sterilization and the termination of unwanted pregnancies.) We will have much more to say about the Western Norm, however, when we take up Bayles arguments for traditional monogamous marriage.
Regarding his arguments against the thesis that promiscuity is morally wrong, we found the analogy he humorously draws between sex and dining is altogether lacking compared to the rich and richly transformative experience of good conversation--facilitated, to be sure, as it may be, by dining. Or even better, we reconsidered the analogy Blackburn draws between musicians and sexual partners with respect to Hobbesian Unity. All of which is to say that Elliston does not give nearly as strong an argument as he could have focusing merely on dining, since that seems to miss the crucial moment of communion we find in sex, conversation, or musicianship. Pointing out there are better analogies, however, only serves to bolster Elliston's arguments.
Next today we took up Halwani's critique of casual sex and promiscuity.
To be clear, Halwani's point is vastly more nuanced than, as we shall see, Bayles' sneering condemnation of sexual and/or romantic arrangements other than traditional heterosexual marriage. Halwani is keen to identify what can be problematic about casual sex and promiscuity--potential pitfalls, if you will, which in the end provide a kind of prescription for how to justifiably or ethically engage in the hooking-up culture, for instance.
The problem for Halwani with casual sex and promiscuity comes down to objectification. Now, because objectification is such an ambiguous term such that it is morally unproblematic in some senses and morally problematic in others, Halwani is careful (following Nussbaum and Langton) to distinguish different senses of 'objectification' or ways in which one might objectify another person. To the extent that fungibility or substitutivity (Blackburn's way of describing it) threatens, we have a potential moral wrong rooted in the Kantian distinction between treating someone as an end in themselves and treating them as a means only.
Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative exhorts us to:
Treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end, and never as a means only.
There are various ways to interpret what it means to treat someone as an end, and never as a means only, which is the constraint at the very core of the second formulation. On one account, to treat someone as an end and not as a means only is to respect their interests as if they were your own. On another account, it seems clear that we use someone when we seek to manipulate or cheat them. So the idea would be that we avoid treating them as a means only to the extent that we respect their autonomy. That is, we respect their right to make their own decisions and choices in treating a person as an end in themselves.
One can see that the feminist literature on objectification is indebted to the Kantian injunction that we never treat ourselves or others as means only, but necessarily as ends in ourselves: feeling, thinking, autonomous agents who ought to enjoy self-determination and the respect due all persons.
To the extent that casual sex and promiscuity might lead one to treat others as a means only (think what it would mean to treat another person as merely an object or masturbatory device, without any consideration for their agency or autonomy), it poses a moral hazard for Halwani.
This is admittedly 'weak tea' against casual sex and promiscuity, for it need not so lead to objectification except in the activities of the thoughtless, heartless, or malicious.
Next time we consider the nature polyamory and ethical non-monogamy more broadly, contrasting those practices with the arguments for monogamy.