Readings
Texts
Notes
Synopsis
Today we turned to the traditional problem of freedom of will after discussing why it is so pressing a problem for us.
It is difficult to understate the importance of responsibility for our relationships and the larger society. Today we discussed some of the ways in which the assumption of responsibility underwrites our social practices. Any short list must include
- Gratitude: It would make no sense to be grateful for another person's kindness if they were under the influence of a psychoactive drug and wouldn't otherwise have given you the time of day.
- Blame: If someone does us injury purely by accident and through no fault of their own, it may for awhile make us feel better to get angry, but we can't really blame the person--accidents do sometimes happen.
- Friendship: Suppose someone were hypnotized to be your friend who otherwise wouldn't be in the least bit so inclined, perhaps because the hypnotizer pities you; if you knew, what value could you place on the friendship?
- Love: A mind-control device to make the object of our desires love us might be tempting, but would it be love?
- Punishment: It would probably be a good idea to imprison someone who randomly assaults others just to keep them from doing so in the future, but doing so could not be construed as an act of punishment since punishment makes no sense in such a case.
Missing in each case (and many others besides!) is any assurance that the object of gratitude, blame, friendship, love, or punishment acted of their own accord. That is, a necessary condition on holding someone responsible is that their actions be up to them and they presumably could have done otherwise.
Being responsible for one's own actions is, then, for one's actions to be decided by oneself, regardless of outside influences and for one's own reasons. The Traditional Problem of Freedom of the Will can be understood as an attempt to explain how one's actions can be at once free yet still be determined by one's own will. For if Determinism is true, it seems our actions cannot be free. Yet if Determinism is not true, it seems our actions cannot be determined by our own wills. We seem, then, to be caught in a remarkable--and, to philosophers at least, deeply disturbing--dilemma.
After fleshing out the dilemma more fully (see the notes, The Traditional Problem of Freedom of Will), we briefly canvassed some of the responses to the traditional problem, while taking pains to recast the problem as an altogether more pressing (and less theologically laden) problem in terms of neural mechanism and autonomy.
To be sure, unlike Phenomenal Consciousness, which we all know we enjoy and yet have no idea how, in a purely physical universe, we do, whether we also enjoy Freedom of Will is very much up for grabs. It may be that we are determined by the very neural mechanisms for which evolution has selected us, in which case our introspective feeling of freely making choices is merely a fantasy or illusion by which we deceive ourselves. This troubling possibility makes the possibility of meeting Dretske's Dictum by building (in theory, at least) a mind that in fact has the capacity to act of its own accord all the more important. Success would constitute an existence proof that it is indeed possible to make free choices, whether we do or not.
Our puzzle, then, is whether a machine can be programmed (remember that we are still operating under the assumption of computationalism, the Hard Problem of Phenomenal Consciousness very much notwithstanding) to act of its own accord.
There is more than a wiff of contradiction, though, between the notion of 'programming' and 'acting of its own accord', since 'programming' is usually understood to be a matter of dictating output based on relevant input. Our challenge is further complicated insofar, then, as we must ask whether machines can even be said to act, in the first place, and if they do, whether they can do so of their own accord, in the second place. We take up the first puzzle next time by considering a host of arguments to the contrary.